Political Significance of Sovereign Wealth Funds by Kamiński, Tomasz
Tomasz Kamiński
(University of Łódź)
Chapter 2
Political Significance of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds
http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/8088-331-4.03
26
Tomasz Kamiński
Reflecting on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from the perspective of political 
science, one can perceive them as state-controlled entities that are instruments 
of state-sponsored foreign policy. As Gilpin (2001) noted, even in the context 
of “a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power 
[…] to channel economic forces in ways favorable to their own national 
interests.” SWFs, as investment arms of countries, can be obviously perceived 
as instruments of a statecraft.
The main aim of this chapter is to conceptualize the political significance 
of SWFs. The analysis starts from the concept of statecraft and its instruments. 
For the purpose of this work, the analysis is concentrated on foreign policy 
as an international dimension of the statecraft and explanation of the role 
of SWFs in this context. In the next part, the review of the academic 
discussion concerning motives behind the SWFs’ activities with a central 
question about the importance of political ones is presented. Concluding 
that states through SWF investments can pursue their policy objectives 
both domestically and internationally, a review of concerns regarding SWF 
investments follows. Finally, the list of risks is presented that should be taken 
into account as long as SWF investments in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) are concerned.
2.1. Statecraft and the economic instruments 
of foreign policy 
Statecraft has traditionally been defined as the art of conducting state 
affairs or all the activities by which statesman strive to protect cherished values 
and to attain desired objectives vis-à-vis other nations and/or international 
organizations (Sprout 1971). Generally, all agree that statecraft includes 
the domestic and international actions of a state and development as well 
as implementation of policy (Ping 2005, p. 13–17). However, the theoretical 
discussion about statecraft was vivid and different researchers employed 
different perspectives to describe “statecraft.”
Baldwin (1985) in his classical “Economic statecraft” claims that in 
international relations statecraft could be understood as governmental 
inf luence attempts directed at other actors (both state and non-state) 
in the international system. In other words, it refers to “the selection of means 
for the pursuit of foreign policy goals.” The techniques of statecraft are usually 
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labelled as “tools,” “means” or “instruments” and all of these terms could be 
used interchangeably. In his approach, there is not much difference between 
instruments of economic foreign policy and economic statecraft.
The instruments of statecraft have been subjected to the taxonomies 
of numerous scholars. Hans Morgenthau (1964) reduced the tools of statecraft 
to two categories: diplomacy and war. However, it is hard not to agree with Ping 
(2005) who said that this dichotomy is too simplified to explain the breadth 
of possible alternatives within peace and war, nor does it acknowledge 
the fundamental difference between domestic and foreign statecraft.
Much more useful, a four-way taxonomy of the statecraft was presented 
by Baldwin (1985). He distinguishes propaganda (“inf luence attempts 
relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols”), 
diplomacy (“influence attempts relying primarily on negotiations”), military 
statecraft (“inf luence attempts relying primarily on violence, weapons 
and force”) and economic statecraft that refers to “influence attempts relying 
on resources which have a reasonable semblance of market price in terms 
of money.”
The Baldwin classification, like any other, has its deficiencies. For instance, 
it is not clear how to classify the sale of military equipment. Should it be 
considered as economic or military statecraft? Depending on the particular case, 
circumstances or analytical approach one might decide to classify them either 
way. Due to the fact that each taxonomy has its “borderline cases” we should 
agree with Baldwin, who claims that their existence does not do serious harm 
to the value of the whole concept.
Following Baldwin’s approach we could define instruments of economic 
statecraft as all of the economic means by which foreign policy makers might 
try to influence other international actors. In this definition the focus is put 
on the implementation of state’s foreign policy, so consequently, the international 
dimension of economic statecraft could also be called “economic instruments 
of foreign policy.”
Analyzing instruments of economic instruments of foreign policy 
we can divide them into positive and negative or, in other words, persuasive 
and coercive. The former (collected in Table 2.1) are associated with attempts 
to promise or provide rewards, the latter (Table 2.2) with an attempt to threaten 
or punish.
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Table 2.1. Examples of positive instruments of Economic Statecraft
Trade related Capital related
Tariff discrimination (favorable) Providing aid
Granting “most-favorable-nation” 
treatment
Investment guarantees
Tariff reduction
Encouragement of private capital 
exports or imports
Direct purchase Taxation (favorable)
Subsidies to exports or imports Promises of the above
Granting licenses (import or export)
Promises of the above
Source: (Baldwin 1985, p. 42).
Table 2.2. Examples of negative instruments of Economic Statecraft
Trade related Capital related
Embargo Freezing assets
Boycott Controls on import and export
Tariff increase Aid suspension
Tariff discrimination (unfavourable) Deprivation of ownership (expropriation)
Withdrawal of “most-favored-nation” 
treatment
Taxation (unfavorable)
Blacklists
Withholding due to international 
organization
Quotas (import or export) Threats of the above
License denial (import or export)
Dumping
Preclusive buying
Threats of the above
Source: (Baldwin 1985, p. 41).
The classification presented above is obviously not comprehensive. One 
of the elements that have to be added are foreign investments, both green-
field and capital. Nowadays, states, usually through state-owned entities such 
as SWFs or state-owned enterprises, invest abroad heavily. Consequently, 
acquisitions of foreign assets, or even promises of acquisition, are important 
positive economic instruments of foreign policy and the withdrawal 
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of money or promises of withdrawal are negative instruments. SWFs, 
employed to use these tools, can be classified as “providers” of some 
instruments of economic statecraft.
2.2. Sovereign wealth funds and the foreign 
policy of the state 
Sovereign wealth funds have attracted a lot of attention of economists 
but relatively little of political scientist. Even new and widely acclaimed 
books on foreign policy do not mention SWF (Alden, Aran 2011) or discuss 
it one sentence (Hill 2016). Among the very few works that presented SWFs 
as instruments of foreign policy, the book of William Norris (2016) seems to be 
the most comprehensive, however it is focused on China only. Therefore, one 
can say that SWFs have not been yet conceptualized as instrument of foreign 
policy or economic statecraft.
We should have in mind, that “sovereign wealth fund” is an umbrella term 
– the breadth and depth of differences in fund organization, management 
and strategic asset allocation make it probably impossible to establish a standard 
for the relationships across the whole industry. A fund’s objectives could be 
as diverse as SWFs are, and varied from strategic and highly-politicized 
to purely financial ones. Murphy (2012) called it a “double bottom line” 
that manifests in two ways. In addition to earning excess financial return, 
funds benefit from increased political influence or furthering strategic interests 
of the sponsor’s citizens.
Some SWFs own statements support this view, admitting that non-financial 
motivations inf luence their investment decisions (Hatton, Pistor 2012). 
Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, the largest SWF to operate 
globally (SWFI Rankings, 2014) is the best example. The fund is permitted 
to invest in targets as long as they will satisfy predefined environmental, labor 
or transparency standards (Chesterman 2008; Clark, Dixon, Monk 2013). So 
a form of “ethical screening” is needed prior to the investment, which obviously 
can be classified as politically-biased and not market-driven behavior.
However, as convincing as the above presented way of thinking is, answering 
the question if SWFs pursue strategic goals along with financial ones has become 
one of the fundamental issues that has been examined by various researchers. 
Many scholars have endeavored to assess to what extent SWFs follow investment 
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strategies driven primarily by financial efficiencies and to what degree they 
respond to political agendas. Interestingly, depending on methodologies 
and time periods applied, varying conclusions come to the fore.
In Balding’s (2008) analysis of foreign and private equity transactions 
undertaken by f lagship SWFs, pointed to an absence of non-economic 
investment motives. Balding thus construed SWFs’ policies to follow the path 
of expected investment efficiency. However, he admitted that “while the evidence 
that sovereign wealth funds have acted historically as instruments of state power 
or in collaboration remains thin, the logic behind the fear is not irrational.” Lixia 
Loh (2010) strongly argued that anti-SWF concerns arise mainly from the lack 
of understanding the role of SWFs and Loh’s research showed no clear evidence 
of funds acting out of purely political motives. Epstein and Rose (2009) even 
advised to make a prudent default assumption that SWFs are market-driven, due 
to the lack of contradictory evidence. Such voices are, however, in the minority.
Most of the other researchers argue that SWF investment policies 
are not entirely driven by profit maximizing objectives but they give different 
explanations. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008), analyzing SWF investment 
strategies, found that funds largely invest to diversify away from industries 
at home and predominantly in countries that share the same culture. 
That suggested that their investment rules are not entirely driven by profit 
maximizing objectives but have some political motivations behind them.
Knill, Lee and Mauck (2012) agreed that political relations play a role in SWF 
decision making. In their empirical study they claim that contrary to predictions 
based on the foreign direct investment (FDI) and political relations literature, 
SWFs prefer to invest in nations with which they have weaker political relations 
and behave differently than rational investors who maximize return while 
minimizing risk.
Clark and Monk (2012) defined SWFs as “long-term investors, whose 
holdings are selected on the basis of their strategic interests (fund and nation) 
rather than the principles of modern portfolio theory.” In this definition they 
made an important distinction between the owner and the fund itself suggesting 
that sometimes the ruling elites of a country and its fund managers might have 
conflicting interests.
Hatton and Pistor (2012) in their very interesting paper also put attention 
on the role of ruling elites. In their work they observed that in political entities 
without electoral democracy, such as China, Singapore, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, 
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the overriding objective of SWFs is to maximize the gains of the politicians. 
They claim that SWF behavior can be explained by the “autonomy-
maximization theory.” In accordance with this theory the true stakeholders 
in SWFs are the ruling elites in the sovereign sponsor, and that as such, 
it is the interests of these elites that SWFs advance. To these elites, SWFs “serve 
as a valuable tool for protecting their interests.” The first and foremost among 
these interests is maintaining their privileged position. Obviously this position 
is often very much dependent on domestic stability or the security of the state, 
so the activities of SWFs may serve a state’s interests as well.
None of the existing characterizations can adequately explain the full 
range of observed SWF behaviors and there is no clear consensus in academic 
literature as far as the explanation of SWF investment strategies is concerned. 
Presumably any pan-industrial conclusions would be highly precarious 
to draw and the level of politicization is highly fund specific. The most 
convincing argument is presented by Manda Shemirani (2011), who claims 
that we should simply apply three different perspectives to the study of SWFs 
and that help us to explain the differences with respect to a funds’ behavior. 
Firstly, SWFs can act as a tool in a state’s foreign policy. Secondly, funds 
are a “metamorphosis of state-run business” and together with other state-
owned or state-controlled entities they are instruments of states acting 
as a entrepreneur e.g. increase earnings and manage political risks. Lastly, 
SWFs serve for various types of “domestic compensation.” A political 
leader might need, for instance, to provide compensation for their voters 
or supporters of the political regime in order to ensure continuity of their 
government. Another example is the need to manage macroeconomic 
deficiencies or bail-out some troubled institutions.
Following Shemirani’s way of thinking we can assume that a behavior 
of a particular SWF is always a mix of those three motives. They are mixed 
in different proportions depending on the fund and may change over time. 
As she noted: “The SWF’s goals can be multiple, changing, or even overlapping, 
in which case the critical question to ask is how the owner balances their 
various goals against each other.” For example, states are faced with extreme 
external pressures, for example global recession may result in the abandonment 
of the main goal of a SWF and divert the fund’s resources for coping 
with economic problems at home. This was the case with Russia. The economic 
troubles resulting from falling oil prices and the sanctions imposed on this 
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country after its aggression on Ukraine, forced the Kremlin to fall back 
on the SWF’s assets to shore up the cash-strapped national budget and wobbly 
Russian Ruble (Flood 2015).
Keynes said years ago that “international cash-flows are always political” 
(Keynes 1933) which today can support the view that when analyzing 
SWFs activities one has to presume there are political motives behind 
them. As Truman (2010) rightly observed “SWFs are political by virtue 
of how they are established, and by their nature are inf luenced to some 
degree by political considerations.” This conclusion has resulted in distrust 
by Western policymakers about SWF intentions and implementing new, 
protectionist policies designed to minimize perceived SWF threats 
(Monk 2008). The types of concerns Western countries have are analyzed 
in the following subchapter.
2.3. Concerns regarding SWF activities 
Concerns over SWF activities have been publicly voiced since 2007. 
In May 2007 information about the acquisition of stakes in Blackstone, 
an American investment fund, by Chinese SWF China Investment Corporation 
hit the headlines of all major newspapers (Arnold et al. 2007). The size 
of the transaction (USD 3 billion), provenance of the capital and rumors 
that the new Chinese fund is going to invest abroad USD 300 billion, made 
Westerners nervous and started a vigorous debate about the potential 
consequences of capital expansion by SWFs.
The most interesting observation, as far as consequences of SWFs rise 
in prominence are concerned, was made by Lawrence Summers who wrote 
in the Financial Times that funds “shake logic of capitalism” that used to be 
based on ongoing privatization (Summers 2007):
The question is profound and goes to the nature of global capitalism. 
A signal event of the past quarter-century has been the sharp decline 
in the extent of direct state ownership of business as the private sector has 
taken ownership of what were once government-owned companies. Yet 
governments are now accumulating various kinds of stakes in what were 
once purely private companies through their cross-border investment 
activities.
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His observation was later supported by Professors Gilson and Milhaupt 
(2008) who have characterized SWFs as “neo-mercantilist” institutions that use 
“company-level behavior” to maximize “country-level […] economic, social, 
and political benefits.”
That narration has been particularly widespread in the United States, where 
almost all agree that, as state sponsored actors, SWFs can be used by their 
mandators for politically driven purposes, potentially harmful for the US. 
Even Barack Obama, during his initial presidential campaign in 2008 
commented: “I am obviously concerned if these… sovereign wealth funds 
are motivated by more than just market consideration and that’s obviously 
a possibility” (Loh 2010).
However, just what are the main threats related to SWF activities? Truman 
(2010) enumerates five types of concerns, though some of them are shared by all 
government-sponsored institutions and do not exclusively relate to sovereign 
funds.
1. Mismanagement of investments by SWFs to the economic and financial 
detriment of the country with the fund.
2. Pursuit of political and economic power objectives via SWFs.
3.  Exacerbation of financial protectionism inspired by SWFs.
4.  The potential for financial turmoil and uncertainty associated with SWF 
activities.
5.  Conflicts of interests between countries with SWFs and countries in which 
they invest.
The first concern primarily involves countries that are home to SWFs, 
so it is beyond the scope of our interests, but the other four deserve closer 
investigation.
Pursuit of political and economic power objectives via SWFs
Governments may use their SWFs to implement various political goals. 
Firstly, thanks to SWF investments states can increase their political influence 
in foreign countries. For example, the People’s Republic of China using promises 
of SWF investment convinced the government of Costa Rica to sever diplomatic 
ties with Taiwan and establishing them with Beijing. According to La Nación, 
Costa Rica’s largest newspaper, China’s SAFE Investment Company bought 
USD 300 million in Costa Rican government bonds in two lots in January 2008 
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and January 2009 in return for this diplomatic move. That was kept in secret, 
however, the newspaper revealed this case and even won the lawsuit, defending 
their right to publish this information (Anderlini 2008; Norris 2016).
Another example of rising political influence comes from Europe. SWFs 
money started to be extremely attractive to European countries seeking 
investment in times of Eurozone crisis. Italy’s finance minister, Giulio Tremonti, 
who was at first skeptical to what he called the “reverse colonization of Europe,” 
in 2011 turned to cash-rich Beijing in the hope that Chinese SWFs would help 
rescue his country from financial crisis by making “significant” purchases 
of Italian bonds and investments in strategic companies (Dinmore 2011). Such 
behavior obviously put Italy in an unfavorable position vis-à-vis China.
The more SWFs invest in a particular country, the bigger the “threat 
of disinvestment” as a political tool. An announcement about the possible 
withdrawal of money from a particular market could be very useful 
to pressure foreign partners. In early 2008, Muammar Gaddafi threatened 
to withdraw Libyan SWF investment from African nations resistant to his idea 
of strengthening the African Union (Drezner 2008). In 2010, during the G20 
meeting in the Korean city of Busan, Eurozone officials met powerful Asian 
investment groups and government officials who expressed concerns about 
Europe’s financial woes and according to the “Financial Times” said “they 
would reduce or halt future purchases of Eurozone bonds unless something was 
done to allay the fears about Europe’s banks.” This declaration had an impact 
on European officials as in that very difficult moment the last thing that any 
debt-laden European government wanted were problems with selling bonds 
(Tett 2010).
Secondly, there is a threat that through SWFs foreign governments could 
take control over strategic industries or critical infrastructure. Alan Tonelson 
articulated this concern in his testimony in American Congress in 2008: “If, 
for example, the Chinese government held significant stakes in a large number 
of big American financial institutions, especially market-makers, and if our 
nation’s current period of financial weakness persists, how willing would 
Washington be to stand up to Beijing in a Taiwan Straits crisis?” (Drezner 2008).
Not only the Chinese threaten Western analysts. For example, in 2007 
an investment company owned by the Abu Dhabi government picked up 
an 8.1% stake in the American-based and second-largest maker of computer 
microprocessors. This investment has raised worries among politicians 
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in Washington over increasing Arab-nation involvement in potentially crucial 
intellectual property in sensitive areas such as defense and technology (Wray 
2007).
Another particularly vulnerable sector is energy. For such SWFs owners 
like China, foreign acquisition of energy companies is perceived as a strategic 
national interest and key issue for the energy security of a country. Host 
countries are naturally cautious about such investments (Sun et al. 2014).
Financial protectionism 
Concerns associated with SWF activities stimulate many countries 
to impose new barriers to capital f lows. New or improved regulations were 
introduced by such countries as the US (Lovery 2012), Canada (Safarian 2012) 
and Germany (Jost 2012). The European Union decided to avoid bringing 
legislative action at the EU level but proclaimed a special document (European 
Commission 2008) in which they recommend soft measures, such as non-
binding guidelines, as a more appropriate response to the rising SWF activity 
in Europe. Consequently, the EU strongly supports the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) initiative to prepare a set of rules that were voluntary agreed upon 
by owners of SWFs in 2008 and are known as “the Santiago Principles.”
Protectionism is perceived by many observers as something principally 
negative because capital markets should remain open to foreign capital flows 
and direct investments. In the opinion of Robert Dohner, an American official 
from the Treasury, it is the most pressing concern that the proliferation of SWFs 
“could provoke a new wave of investment protectionism, which would be very 
harmful to the global economy” (USCC 2008). Kratsas and Truby (2015) 
presented academic proof that regulatory responses on SWFs are associated 
with the risk of becoming overtly protectionist and imposing unwanted costs 
on the global financial system.
Nevertheless, the author found no evidence that these newly erected 
barriers really cause harm to the financial system or stop the f low of SWF 
capital. We can presume that the relatively low number of SWF investments 
in Germany and comparatively large ones in the United Kingdom, is to some 
extent linked to the more open attitude of the British government and liberal law 
environment. Obviously the German law that allows the government to block 
SWF acquisition of large stakes in German companies that could “threaten 
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Germany’s interests” may seems discouragingly arbitrary, but there is no proof 
that this is a reason behind the lower attractiveness of the German market 
for SWFs.
To conclude – the threat of protectionism is so far much more potential than 
real. For instance, Thatcher’s (2013) comparison of German, Italian and French 
policy toward SWFs even proved that although all three countries have passed 
legislation regulating foreign equity investment, the provisions remain limited, 
and direct actions against have almost never been used.
Financial turmoil and uncertainty 
The next concern related to SWFs is linked to their impact on financial 
market stability. There is a vivid academic discussion over the question whether 
SWFs contribute to capital market volatility or if they can act as market 
stabilizers. A few stylized facts can be derived from this ongoing debate 
(Wiśniewski, Kamiński, Obroniecki 2015).
Firstly, some SWF features make them natural market stabilizers. They 
are relatively large, highly liquid, long term orientated, not significantly 
leveraged, with a substantial appetite for risk, less sensitive to market 
conditions (than other institutional investors) and focused on global portfolio 
diversification in search for superior returns (Mezzcapo 2009). Due to such 
characteristics, SWFs can promote stability in the global financial market.
Secondly, companies tend to profit from SWF investments. Fernandes’s 
(2009) research on SWF portfolio activities in 2002–2007 demonstrated 
that capital markets had placed a high premium on SWF co-investment (such 
a premium had reached 20%). Such favorable market reaction to SWF entry 
announcements confirm the findings of Kotter and Lel (2008), who found 
that SWF investments have a positive effect on a target firms’ stock prices 
around the announcement date, although not in the long run.
Thirdly, SWFs generally follow investment practices of other established 
classes of institutional investors (such as public pension-, mutual- or hedge 
funds). Kotter and Lel (2011) suggested that SWF behavior mirrors that of other 
institutional investors in their preference for target characteristics and in their 
impact on target firm performance. Similarities to mutual funds were proved 
by Avendaño and Santiso (2012) who claimed that despite contrasts in portfolio 
allocation, the two types of collective investment schemes do not radically differ 
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in their investment routines. These may suggest that SWFs behaviors are no 
riskier than other market players.
Fourthly, SWFs have the potential to play a stabilizing role on worldwide capital 
markets because they serve as the “buyers-of-last-resort” when markets are falling. 
Despite their heavy losses sustained during the global financial crisis (Kunzel 
et al. 2010), and the fact that during the liquidity crunch SWFs were used to provide 
liquidity for their home markets, the funds did not refrain from international 
lending. For certain cash-strapped companies in the West, they turned out 
to be veritable “white knights” – friendly investors that despite high risks moved 
to salvage distressed companies. Couturier et al. (2009) cite the example of Bank 
Barclay, which being on the verge of bankruptcy managed to attract funding 
from three Gulf SWFs (albeit on premium terms). In a broader context, the SWFs’ 
readiness to invest counter-cyclically is per se a stabilizing factor.
Finally, there is no evidence of their destabilizing activities on the markets. 
Sun and Hesse (2009) even tried to prove the opposite – in their study they 
tried to prove that there was a significant destabilizing effect of SWFs 
on equity markets, at least in short-term perspectives. Obviously, they stressed 
that the assessment of the longer-term impact of SWF investments and their 
potentially stabilizing role will require more research but thus far SWFs have 
behaved responsibly.
The above mentioned arguments seems to prove that SWFs are not 
destabilizing as such. Their potential contribution to market turmoil depends 
on sponsoring states. In one set of circumstances a given SWF can contribute 
to financial stability but in another the very same SWF can foment the hostile 
political strategy of its state.
Conflicts of interests 
Investments by SWFs also create clear possibilities of conflicts of interests 
between the funds, owners or managers of targeted companies as well 
as governments of the host countries. It is easy to imagine that a politically 
motivated fund invests in a company to be able to influence the management 
or gain access to privileged technological or military know-how. Sensitive 
information could be stolen and transferred to, for example, a state-owned 
enterprise that is a direct competitor. From the investor state point-of-view, losses 
from the investment in a foreign company can be balanced by additional gains 
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in the domestic company. Apart from industrial espionage a hostile fund can also 
facilitate sabotage of critical infrastructure such as aqueducts or electric plants.
The above mentioned concerns are usually refuted by SWFs and some 
researchers on the basis of observation that funds tend to concentrate on long-
term profits, buy minority stakes and are not interested in having some impact 
on the management of a company. In other words, SWFs are usually passive 
and not active investors (Fotak et al. 2013). However, this is not always the case. 
China Investment Corporation (CIC), for instance, whose president publicly 
said in 2008 that the fund does not want board seats and has instructions to take 
passive roles in its investments, has gained influence on the boards of four 
prominent companies (Koch-Weser, Hacke 2013). Some of them are operating 
in sectors perceived as sensitive or strategic.
On the board of the AES Corporation, a global power company, CIC installed 
Zhang Guobao, who was a high-level Chinese government official, former vice-
chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, the main 
planning agency. Such an appointment has to raise doubts about potential 
political motivations behind his activities.
Other companies with CIC representatives on the board were: Canadian 
Teck Resources, Shanduka Group from South Africa and Heathrow Ltd., 
the operator of London’s biggest airport. Nobody has been caught red-handed 
but potential conflicts of interests between a foreign country, to which a member 
of board is subordinate to, the interests of the company and host country 
are clear. The absence of negative experiences does not remove concerns 
that the occurrence of abuses will only be a matter of time.
Conclusions 
Diplomacy can and should be viewed through lenses of political interests 
of actors. SWFs are not independent political actors but only investment arms 
that a state can instrumentally use to pursue political and economic power. 
Therefore, the political significance of SWFs, its stabilizing or destabilizing 
inclinations, are a function of their sponsoring states. In one set of circumstances 
a given SWF can contribute to financial stability but in another the very same 
SWF can implement the hostile political strategy of its state. Consequently, 
it is instructive to analyze the manifest or covert interests and political strategies 
of countries exerting control over specific SWFs – and not funds as such.
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SWF activities in the region could be potentially harmful only when 
the donor state were to demonstrate explainable interests in destabilizing 
the CEE states and when the scale of involvement were to be big enough. Unless 
the SWF owner does not have vital national interests in the region. The risk 
of hostile maneuvering via SWFs is limited. Due to this fact, all analyses of fund 
activities have to include an assessment of the political interest of their owners 
in a particular state or region.
As far as types of risks regarding usage of SWFs by sponsoring states 
are concerned we could point out three that seem to be particularly important 
from the perspective of CEE countries. Firstly, SWFs are convenient to use 
leverage on a host country. In fact, all CEE states have to actively search 
for foreign capital and investment promises from foreign financial institutions 
are very much welcomed. It provides space for political pressure from states 
behind potential investors. Secondly, SWFs could be used to exercise control 
over strategic resources or critical infrastructure. Taking into consideration 
many security threats for the countries in the region that come from energy 
or economic dependency from foreign countries (most notably Russia), further 
losing control over sensitive assets may be risky. Thirdly, through SWFs foreign 
countries could search for access to privileged technological and military 
know-how, facilitate espionage or sabotage sensitive enterprises. Market 
valuation of “crown jewels enterprises” of CEE states are usually relatively low, 
in comparison with the enormous capital gathered in the SWFs. Many of them 
are already privatized, with only minority stakes in governmental hands. 
That is why, they are vulnerable for hostile take overs.
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